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§ 9.01 FRAND AND COMPULSORY LICENSES: ANALYSIS AND
COMPARISON
Srividhya Ragavan and Raj S. Davé
[A] Introduction
Licenses are important tools to capture the full market value of many of the
intangible assets. In that, licenses serve an important function in all areas of intel-
lectual property rights to effectively capitalize on the value of the property. Opera-
tionally, intellectual property licenses are private agreements between two parties,
one of whom will be the owner of the intellectual property, typically detailing the
rights relating to the use, dissemination, development of the property. Especially
in the area of patents, licenses are the most important tools deployed by the inven-
tor to ensure that the technology is appropriately captured by the market. Without
a license, the patent owner would be forced to singularly engage in all effort
towards manufacturing and marketing the invention. Using different forms of
licenses, the patentee can engage in various exclusive and non-exclusive forms of
licenses in different markets. Similarly, while retaining rights of ownership, the
patent owner can engage in distribution and marketing of the invention by impos-
ing appropriate terms and conditions of sale, use and further development over
the technology.
Licenses, in general, being agreements structured within the boundaries of
privity of parties, typically reflect of different bargaining parities and expecta-
tions of the particular licensor and licensee. Nevertheless, basic fundamental
issues such as identifying the technology, its boundaries, its terms of use are com-
mon threads that are seen several licensing arrangements. In that, the strength of
technology as well as the bargaining parities of parties remains major items that
in turn, reflect on the strength of the different terms of the license. Notwithstand-
ing the privity of parties that characterize licenses, the complexity of the market,
the players and the globalization of each of the channels of manufacturing and
distribution has necessitate policies that streamline this area of law. A well-
structured license regime especially those that involve inventions can encourage
incremental innovation over existing technology by facilitating dissemination to
a wider audience of researchers and collaborators while continuing to generate
income for the patent owner.
This section compares two different forms of licenses being FRAND and
compulsory license. Both forms of licenses are critical to achieve access to oth-
erwise difficult to access technologies. The FRAND licenses have been widely
embraced, especially in the software, mobile phones, and communications sec-
tors. Compulsory licenses have been sparingly used by Governments where the
public’s need for the invention was considered to over-weigh the needs of the pat-
entee, essentially for pharmaceuticals. Compulsory licenses have been univer-
sally criticized for being an imposed burden on the patentee. In comparing these
two forms of licenses, this section outlines that despite the obvious differences
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operationally both of these have stark similarities and highlights areas where com-
pulsory licenses operate more efficiently. In doing so, this section highlights that
perhaps each of the forms of licenses can borrow from the other to minimize the
weaknesses to ultimately enable more access for critical inventions.
[B] FRAND Licenses
The term FRAND is an acronym for “Fair, Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory,” which signifies the presence of these specific features in the
license. Products embodying information and communication technology (ICT)
usually embody multiple patents from different owners that have to work on a
common platform to create the required outcome. The FRAND licenses were a
response to technological development, which necessitated inter-operability of
and between such devices. As the diversity of technological offerings increased,
the interoperable feature became important not just for consumers (to preserve the
option to move from one device to another) but also for the patent holder to
exploit the patent effectively. That is, once a standardized technology (or techni-
cal standards) is put in place, innovations should develop using the standard as a
basic platform. Standards harmonize various operational aspects of the industry
and thus, create a broad, uniform platform to interact effectively. Such standards
take the form of a set of technical specifications that provide, or attempt a com-
mon design to a product or process in a given sector.1 The several devices that are
developed using android as the platform in the market serve as a great example.
In fact, it would be cost-ineffective for every device maker to switch to or create
new technical platforms or standards. Given this, as a certain level of inter-
operability is established as the standard, the industry has a stake in ensuring that
the owner of patents over a technological standard could license it with a view to
prevent hold-over problems. A hold-over problem arises when a patent owner
refuses to engage in a reasonable license of a technology which becomes a base
for the development of further innovation. When identified patents become essen-
tial to achieve the goal of interoperability, it naturally becomes difficult for one
patent owner to operate in a space that is delineated from the rights of other own-
ers. Thus, organizations that set technical–standards freeze certain patents as stan-
dards essential and cause the patent owners to subject such patents to FRAND
licenses.
Historically, Professor Contreras suggests that from World War II through the
1970s, courts, when considering antitrust and abuse of patent issues, has passed
more than “one hundred decrees ordering patent holders to license their patents to
1 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights & Standards-Setting Organiza-
tions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002).
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all applicants on terms that were fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.”2 Modern
day FRAND licenses are used under the umbrella of Standards Setting Organiza-
tions (SSOs). The contemporary use of FRAND licenses by the SSOs can be owed
to various reasons. The proliferation of patents especially in the ICT sector has cre-
ated what is termed as patent thickets. The term patent thicket refers to the presence
of several overlapping patents, which necessitates any third party interested in com-
mercializing the technology to navigate through dense patents and negotiate the
rights to commercialize the technology.3 Given this, the enormous market power
that the holder will generate from owning a Standards Essential Patent (SEPs) has
necessitated that the industry self-regulates with some over-sight to ensure access to
the technology. Consequently, the SSOs are vested with the task of ensuring that the
important standard setting patents are sieved out and remains licensable for use by
all companies. The SSOs play a role enabling owners of patents dealing with
standards that bear essential interoperable features to designate their patent as a
standard.
SSOs & FRAND
In gist, the SSOs and SDOs (Standards Developing Organizations) are mem-
bership organizations to which leaders and aspiring leaders of the industry can
belong. These organizations can be accredited or unaccredited and can cover a
variety of technical areas in which they play a role in establishing standards.4 In
the United States, the American National Standards Institute, or ANSI (www.
ansi.org) is an important global SSO, which “oversees the creation, promulgation
and use of thousands of norms and guidelines that directly impact businesses in
nearly every sector: from acoustical devices to construction equipment, from
dairy and livestock production to energy distribution, and many more.”5 The pre-
decessor of ANSI, the American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC),
played an important role in the creation of the International Standards Associa-
tion (ISA),6 which over time became the International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO).7 Other independent standard setting organizations like the Institute
2 See Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND, Working Paper Series, SSRN Abstract:
2374983, Aug. 7, 2014, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2374983 (last visited January 2015).
3 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-
Setting, INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 1 118-50, available at http://faculty.haas
.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
4 Andrew Updegrove, What and (Why) is an SSO?, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO STANDARDS, available
at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/whatisansso.php (last visited January 2015).
5 See ANSI: Historical Overview, available at http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/
history.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited January. 2015).
6 See ANSI: Historical Overview, available at http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/
history.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited January 2014).
7 See International Organization for Standardization, ISO’s Mission, available at http://www
.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited January 13, 2015).
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of Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IEEE) and the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) publish standards and work with the objective of fostering
“technological innovation and excellence for the benefit of humanity.”8
Patent owners submit their patents to SSOs, which can elevate their patents
as SEPs. For example, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI),9 an SSO covering the telecommunications industry in Europe has a spe-
cific form for declaration of patents that can become a standard.10 If a standard
cannot be implemented without a particular patent being infringed, then that
patent is said to be standards essential.11 Alternately, an SSO can adopt a particu-
lar recommendation or specification as a standard, then companies owing patents
that cover the said standard should make declarations of their patents.12 Some-
times members of an SSO work together towards creating a common standard.
The ETSI publishes a Work Program every year that provides an overview of the
standardization projects that are underway. Similarly, the International Telecom-
munications Union, a United Nations body that sets standards in this area also
provides an overview of work in progress in this area.13 Under such circum-
stances, members tend to work together to develop standards although there have
been instances where members approved standards-requests from third parties
without disclosing a pending patent only to reveal them later.14 For instance, Dell
was accused of not disclosing its patent contrary to the policy of Video Electron-
ics Standards Association (VESA) during the VL-bus standard development pro-
cess.15 The issue arose when, after the standard was approved, Dell sought to
enforce its ’481 patent rights against various VL-bus manufacturers who had
implemented the standard.16 This resulted in antitrust scrutiny of Dell’s patents
8 See Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineering, IEEE’s Mission, available at http://
www.ieee.org/about/vision_mission.html (last visited January 13, 2015). See also Internet Engi-
neering Task Force, IETF’s Mission, available at http://www.ietf.org/about/mission.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 30, 2014).
9 See also European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI’s Mission, available at
http://www.etsi.org/about (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).
10 See, e.g., ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 52, 53 (last modified Dec. 19,
2014), available at http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-guide-on-ipr.pdf (last visited January
2015).
11 See Janice M. Mueller, Potential Antitrust Liability Based on a Patent Owner’s Manipulation
of Industry Standards Setting, 2003, A.B.A. Sec. Antitrust L., available at http://apps.americanbar
.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-exemc/pdf/liability.pdf (last visited January 13, 2015).
12 See Andrew Updegrove, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About FRAND (But Didn’t
Know Who to Ask), available at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=
20120221074826486 (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).
13 See generally International Telecommunications Union, available at http://www.itu.int/en/
ITU-T/Pages/default.aspx (last visited January 2015).
14 Andrew Updegrove, Laws, Cases and Regulations, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO STANDARDS, avail-
able at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/laws.php#dell (last visited January 2015).
15 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (May 1996).
16 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (May 1996). See also Updergrove, note 14, supra.
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resulting in a consent decree issued by the FTC preventing Dell, among other
things, from enforcing any patent right required to use or implement an industry
standard since it had intentionally failed to disclose such right during the standard
setting process.17
Policies of SSOs detail the terms for licensing SEPs, one of which generally
dictates that the patent is licensed on FRAND terms.18 FRAND licensing is thus,
an industry-adopted practice to enables users of an SEP to pay fair and reason-
able royalties as part of the patent owner’s negotiations with the SSO.19 Once a
patent is designated as an SEP using an independent evaluation process, then the
patent owner can make it available for licensing as a standard on negotiated terms.
Alternately, the owner can refuse to license leaving the patent as an area that the
SSO would have to design around. Generally, patent owners recognize that it is in
their own interest to have their patents adopted as a standard. Owning a SEP
patent that is licensed on FRAND terms provides the strategic ability to influence
the trajectory of technological development of a standard by being a part of the
Governing members of the SSO. Further, it can create opportunities to develop
certification and branding for standards-compliant products.20 Furthermore, the
patent is posited to gain volume licensing in place of a lesser licenses for higher
royalties.
The expectation with all SEP patents is that the licensor would offer the
same or similar terms to all users, which will lead to competitiveness of the given
patent’s prospective market. Notably, while the general requirement is to be fair
and reasonable, the constituents of these terms are left undefined, especially in
relation to two or more licensees, which have raised more questions in this area
of law.21 Generally, the term “fair” relates to the anti-competitive nature of the
underlying terms, while “reasonable” relates to the value of technology
17 In the Matter of Dell Computer Corp., Docket No. C-3658, May 20, 1996.
18 See generally Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, National
Research Council 31-50 (2013).
19 See Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 34 J.
MARSHAL L. REV. 897 (2001), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol17/
mueller.pdf (last visited January 13, 2015).
20 See Updegrove, note 14, supra, at Participating in Standard Setting Organizations: Value
Propositions, Roles and Strategies, available at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/part
icipating1.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).
21 See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Taking Contracts Seriously: The Meaning of the Vol-
untary Commitment to License Essential Patens on “Fair and Reasonable” Terms, available at
http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3233990_1.pdf (last visited January
13, 2015). See, e.g., Saumya Srivastava, Standard Essential Patents and Competition Law, 2013,
Competition Commission of India, available at http://cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/
Standard%20Essential%20Patents%20and%20competition%20law.pdf (last visited January 2015).
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considering the other prevailing patents in this area, the “non-discriminatory”
means to ensure comparable licensing terms between competitors.22
Generally, patent owners allow licensees the rights to use their patents in
addition to other patents declared “essential” or “necessary” by the SSO.23 The
patent owner cannot block implementation of a standard by licensing at exorbi-
tant prices and cannot refuse to license the patent or disclose them.24 Despite the
voluntary nature of a FRAND license, its inherent contractual nature causes them
to suffer from the same malaise that every contract is subject to.25 In the event of
a dispute, the confluence of contractual issues with the associated intellectual
property rights provides a diversity of remedies, the choice of which determines
the outcome rather than clear policy or legislative guidelines. Patent owners have
successfully used contractual remedies and other injunctive relief, although the
battles have been long and arduous.26
[C] Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licenses are meant to balance the patent owner’s right with the
societal need for the product, and operate where public interest concerns out-
weigh the patent holders’ rights.27 Compulsory licenses are best defined as “invol-
untary contract[s] between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and
enforced by the state.”28 Unlike a FRAND license, which is a “voluntary” com-
mitment by the licensor to negotiate fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms, a compulsory licenses forces the patent owner to license.29 However, both
22 See id. See also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standards-Essential Patents, 28 J. BERKELEY L. & TECH. 1135-66 (2013), avail-
able at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/frand.pdf.
23 See Jonathan Radcliffe & Gillian Sproul, FRAND and the Smartphone Wars, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MAGAZINE 45-47 (Winter 2011/2012); See generally John Cassels, What is FRAND (last
modified Aug. 29, 2013), Mondaq, available at http://www.mondaq.com/x/260184/Patent/What+
Is+FRAND (last visited January 2015).
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.1991-96
(2007).
27 Rafael V. Baca, Compulsory Patent Licensing in Mexico in the 1990’s: The Aftermath of
NAFTA and the 1991 Industrial Property Law, 35 IDEA183, 184-85 (1994); see also David J.
Henry, Multi-National Practice in Determining Provisions in Compulsory Patent Licenses, 11 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 325 (1977).
28 See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Real-
ity, 33 IDEA 349, 349 (1993) (quoting Paul K. Gorecki, Regulating the Price of Prescription Drugs
in Canada: Compulsory Licensing, Product Selection, and Government Reimbursement Pro-
grammes, Economic Council of Canada (1981)).
29 See Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court
in Pharma v. Walsh and the Trips Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 782 (2004).
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FRAND and CLs means to result in a fair and reasonable license of an intellec-
tual property protected technology. While FRAND licenses emphasize providing
the licensee with reasonable terms, compulsory licenses enable access to an oth-
erwise inaccessible invention. Both forms of can affect market exclusivity and the
market price of the licensed product by creating a value for the licensed product
that can be remarkably different from its true market value. Nevertheless, both
forms ultimately result in benefitting the end-consumer who pays less to access a
product subject to either of these forms of licenses.
While FRAND licenses have been universally embraced but it is also
acknowledged that the diversity of remedies has caused differences in the out-
come and thus, has muddied the picture. For instance, a patent owner who alleges
infringement of SEP can seek injunctive relief under Title 35.30 In a standards-
setting environment, if an injunction is issued by a court order, it increases the
bargaining parity of the patent owner and forces potential licensees to the nego-
tiating table contributing to the patent hold-up problem.31 Conscious that a guar-
antee of automatic injunctions for alleged infringement empowers the patent
owner to stall competitors, courts issue injunctions only if the SEP plaintiff can
prove harm beyond failure of royalty negotiation.32 Similarly, money damages to
remedy the breach of FRAND contract require proof of infringement with harm
to the patent owner, as per the court in Apple v. Motorola.33 The alternate remedy
is for a breach of the FRAND contract, is generally pursued by the licensee as the
third-party beneficiary of the contract. In the dispute between Motorola and
Microsoft, Judge Robart of the District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington State to reset the royalty rates Motorola was charging on their SEPs, rather
than force Motorola to settle. Patentees also tend towards the alternative under
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193034 under which the patent owner has the
option of approaching the International Trade Commission (ITC) seeking an
exclusion order preventing the defendant from importing his product into the
United States on the grounds that “domestic industries” are affected until resolu-
tion of either the breach of contract claim from the FRAND agreement, or, the
patent infringement suits. The exclusion order creates the same effect as an
30 35 U.S.C. § 283. See also Standards Essential Patents and Injunctive Relief, available at
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/77a53dff-786c-442d-8028-906e1297060b/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/270fc132-6369-4063-951b-294ca647c5ed/Standards-Essential%20Patents
.pdf (last visited January 13, 2015).
31 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012); See e.g., Colleen V.
Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2012).
32 See for e.g.,Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012).
33 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2012); See Mikey Campbell,
Apple’s Patent Case Against Motorola Dismissed “With Prejudice,” available at http://apple
insider.com/articles/12/06/22/apples_patent_case_against_motorola_dismissed_with_prejudice (last
viewed January 13, 2015).
34 See also The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
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injunction by pushing the defendant to negotiate with the plaintiff. Further, the
status of the ITC as an administrative body makes it relatively convenient and
faster to get relief.35 In a recently released report of the Department of Justice,
the ITC was urged to re-consider the use of exclusion order in favor of FRAND-
licensors on the grounds that a royalty negotiation occurring under threat of an
exclusion order would skew in favor of the patentee in a manner inapposite to the
patentee’s RAND commitment. In addition to all of these, antitrust remedies are
still possible and widely used in Europe. In summation, although SSOs and
FRAND licensing have potential to be positive forces, they currently use up court
time and remain highly inefficient.
Compulsory licensing bypasses the issues of FRAND licensing because the
Government establishes license terms including the royalty rates. Although that
royalty may not be ideal, it is clearly defined up front and in a good compulsory
license regime, there is scope for patentee to challenge that rate. When India com-
pulsorily licensed Bayer’s Sorafenib when it was sold at an egregious price of
Rs.2,80,428 per month (about $5,000) to cater to cancer patients, the royalty rates
were raised from 6% to7% on appeal based on the market conditions by the Intel-
lectual Property Appellate Board. Most compulsory licensing litigation tends to
be with the Government and hence, can potentially reduce the issues that result
from defensive strategies. Further, the upfront determination of royalties provides
the patentee with information to take into consideration. For instance, Gilead suc-
cessfully negotiated a voluntary license in India for its hepatitis C drugs perhaps
seeing how Bayer’s pricing became an exemplar of publicity disaster for the com-
pany. Operationally compulsory licenses are more efficient when compared with
FRAND licensing. For instance, the mere presence of compulsory licensing
options will minimize the patentee’s use of pricing or other strategies with a view
to create an artificial demand, which has become a common issue with FRAND
licenses. Notwithstanding all of the above, the primary issue is that the compul-
sory nature of such licenses can work to dis-incentivize patent owners.
Compulsory licenses are an example of regulatory mechanism where the
government interferes to make corrections. That is, compulsory licenses are a
by-product of the government’s determination that the need of the public for the
patent overweighs the patentee’s rights to exploit it commercially. FRAND
licenses represent an example of market forces working through the industrial
associations to determine that a patent is integral for the further development of
that technology, and that it should be licensed by the owner on FRAND terms.
That is, the SSO as an industry-body determines that a patent is standards essen-
tial and should be licensed on FRAND terms. In effect though, while in FRAND
licenses the patent owner retains the right to refuse to license the patent, market
conditions would dictate licensing on FRAND terms as the more prudent option.
Thus, ultimately, both of types of license prevail upon the patent owner, although
35 Chien & Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, note 31, supra.
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compulsory licenses prevail directly. Also, having the governments negotiate the
value is generally perceived by the patent owner as being disadvantageous on the
grounds that the bargaining parities may be pitted against them in spite of
instances such as the Gilead example in India and GSK’s successful negotiations
in Brazil where patent owners have negotiated a reasonable bargained for royalty.
From the consumers’ perspective, compulsory licenses removes the biggest
debilitating factor of the FRAND license being, the uncertainty involved with
royalty negotiation. The pre-set royalty rates in the case of a compulsory license
lend a certain level of stability for users of the technology. In software patent
terms, for end-users this system reduces the cost, litigation and patent-hold over
related inefficiencies. Also, one of the biggest criticisms with the FRAND
licenses is that SEPs have become defensive tools used to gain business strength
between competitors rather than a tool to innovate. For example, Google’s pur-
chase of the Motorola mobility’s patents was a defensive acquisition given that
Oracle accused Google of infringing upon Oracle’s Java patents. When Google
acquired Motorola’s patents, the portfolio consisted of patents on networking and
video encoding technology thereby creating a defense for Google which could
counter-allege that Oracle was infringing on some of Google’s patents. Consid-
ering this and other similar cases, both in the United States and Europe, investi-
gations have been commissioned to determine the presence of any prevailing
abuse of the involved SEPs.36 A compulsory license regime will largely eliminate
such defensive acquisitions.
[D] A Hybrid of FRAND and Compulsory License
While the above narrative compared both of these forms of licenses, the sec-
tion asserts that a more workable model would be a hybrid of these licenses that
operates to eliminate the inherent debilitating constraints of both forms of
licenses. Importantly, just like the SSOs prevail in the ICT sector, there are orga-
nizations such as the Medicines Patent Pool that work towards a license model to
provide access to medication. These models rely on licenses based on fair-
royalties, which are typically negotiated to provide access to innovative products
in poorer areas of the world and like FRAND licenses are lesser than the market
rate of royalties.
Organizations that operate with different types of technologies should iden-
tify patents that would be considered as standard for that particular technology.
Having a system to negotiate standard agreements from patentee will benefit all
parties involved including the users by reducing the litigation and associated costs
36 See U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (U.S.P.T.O.), Policy
Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary FRAND Commitments
(last modified Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf
(last visited January 2015).
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therein. Standardization of the terms of licenses are not a new phenomenon—
several organizations including the International Telecommunication Union, the
Department of Justice, United States Patent and Trademarks Office, Competition
Policy International are just some examples of organizations that have already
undertaken work to reduce litigations that seem to plague the proliferation of
these licenses.37 Where a patent owner reneges on the standard terms and condi-
tions, a system that provides the ability to seek alternatives would result in more
voluntary licenses and access. Given the falling quality of patents, a system that
facilitates less litigation and more licenses would increase efficiency.
Interestingly, access to technology is as important as access to medicines.
One caters to the digital divide, which affects the larger economy as a whole while
the other caters to right to health issues. Access to medicines is required to avoid
public health crisis while access to technology increases interaction by connect-
ing people, provides educational, job related opportunities, and reduces the gap
for the marginalized in society. In poorer nations, access to technology is impor-
tant to achieve the objectives of the international trade regime while access to
medicines is important to maintain labor capital. Both forms of access remain
critical to achieve the larger objective of TRIPS outlined in Article 7.38 The objec-
tives of TRIPS, outlined in Article 7, assert the importance of “protection and
enforcement of IP rights” to “national social and economic welfare of members.”
When access to technology and health care becomes a privilege of a certain class,
it reiterates the class system and perpetuates the class-based divisions that cause
more social and economic malaise, which is exactly what the international trade
agreements hope to prevent.
The section does not suggest that governments should jump in and compul-
sorily license medicines and technology but it does propose the need to work
towards a hybrid model that can lead to meaningful access to achieve the goals of
the trade regime. Thus, a hybrid form of license that standardizes the rates or the
ranges as well as other terms of the licenses would improve efficiencies of two
diverse sets of industry, being the ICT and pharmaceuticals.
37 See, e.g., William New, ITU Undertakes Work On Standards Essential Patents, IP-watchdog,
Oct. 12, 2012, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/10/12/itu-undertakes-work-on-standard-
essential-patents/ (last visited January 2015); see also Kai-Uwe Kühn, Fiona Scott Morton, &
Shelanski, Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licens-
ing Problem, CPI Anti-trust Chronicle, Mar. 23, 2013, available at https://www.competitionpolicy
international.com/assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar-13Special.pdf (last visited January 2015); see
also Florian Mueller, UN Agency ITU to Hold High-Level Talks on Standard-Essential Patent Liti-
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